EU membership has given the UK irreplaceable opportunities to project its foreign policy interests far beyond its relative size. Yet all this is about to end writes Tim McNamara. 

Even taking into account, UN Security Council permanent membership, being a nuclear power and  having a large military budget, the UK also ‘punches far above its weight’ thanks its EU membership.

It is not widely realised in the UK beyond diplomatic circles but the twenty eight Member States of the EU coordinate a vast amount of international treaty negotiations as well as finding common positions on a multitude of foreign and security issues. The UK and one or two others nearly always takes a leading role in such issues.

Much of the important foreign policy issues are discussed at the monthly Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) at the EU’s Council of Ministers. The Commission always relied on its representative offices in the Member States to send in reports of individual countries positions on each agenda point so as to be fully prepared for the Council meetings.

For several years until 2015 each month I used to edit all such reports and write a short briefing note summarising all positions and then circulate the briefing to the 28 Commissioners and senior management in the Commission. Of course the briefing note was routinely leaked to many EU capitals.

For several years before that I was based in the Commission’s London office and often used to attend Foreign & Commonwealth office briefings about the UK’s positions prior to monthly FAC meetings and report back to the Commission. These briefings were always well attended and the political desks from most EU embassies attended. There would often be questions clarifying the UK’s position.

The exact same circumstances took place for the monthly Economic and Finance Councils (Ecofin) with briefings from the Treasury. The same applied to General affairs councils (also the FCo) Agriculture and Fisheries Councils, international trade etc. With reports being sent to Brussels.

The most significant meetings were the  European Council meetings attended by all 28 Heads of government. These took place out times a year (two formal in June and December and two informal meetings).

The main conclusion from these experiences was how many other Member States looked to the UK, France and Germany to provide a lead on international issues and inter-EU issues. Countries such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Czech Republic, Poland etc used to take a great interest in the UK’s individual positions so to help formulate their own.

Often if the UK and France (with their long history of internationally recognised foreign policy expertise) agreed, then there was very little debate amongst most other Member States. Thus the UK’s foreign policy interests were accorded a far greater importance than would have been the case in other circumstances.

Of course there were some disagreements, the Iraq war being one. Yet it was a rare exception rather than the rule that the EU could not find a common position amongst all 28 Member States.

The projection of British influence through EU membership also extends to a multitude of international fora.

For example examine EU’s role in the International Maritimes Organisation (IMO), which is responsible for measures cover all aspects of international shipping – including ship design, construction, equipment, manning, operation and disposal – to ensure that the shipping sector remains safe, environmentally sound, energy efficient and secure.

Shipping is an EU competence, that means that the EU as a whole decides policy and votes as one bloc in the IMO. This gives the EU a significantly increased weight than if it voted individually. All Member states representatives meet before each meeting to iron out common positions and vote accordingly. The UK and France with long maritime histories often find common cause in the IMO and normally have the backing of the other 26 member states in pursuit of their interests.

The EU plays a very similar role in the World Trade Organisation. It is one of many fora that ensures that the USA, for example, has to treat the EU as an equal partner due to its economic might and population size. Even apparently minor, but significant organisations such as the International Postal Union (which decides on all aspects of global postage rules), the EU’s interests are decided en bloc.

The Commission also has diplomatic delegations in most countries in the world. These delegations regularly submit reports on political developments in their respective countries. Matters of interest to the EU and its Member States are regularly followed and reported on.

The UK will lose direct access to such intelligence and channels of influence. This especially matters in countries where the UK has weaker relations/historical ties/common language than others such as France or Spain.

The UK may well have the ‘capacity’ to know what is going on in EU capitals as well as in the EU’s institutions. What it will not have is a place at the table when matters are being discussed and policy formulated.

UK politicians have often played up the so-called ‘special relationship’ with the USA. Washington DC has given it a patina of respectability that is more window-dressing than hard fact. However, where it has played a role is in the fact that London has acted as a bridge to the EU for US interests that are impacted by EU policy,

This will no longer be the case, Berlin will figure much more highly in the US State Department’s list of strategic partners than the UK in the future.

Not only will the absence of the UK from the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world significantly weaken its standing in the world, but it will also serve to enhance France and Germany’s international prestige. In the case of Germany, the end of a long haul to reassert its global influence.

Tim McNamara is the editor of www.policyreview.co.uk and is a former European Commission official